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Abstract
It is well known that non-renegotiable contracts with third parties may have an effect on the
outcome of a strategic interaction and thus serve as a commitment device. We address this issue
when contracts are renegotiable. More precisely, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes of two-
stage games with renegotiation-proof third-party contracts in relation to the equilibrium out-
comes of the same game without contracts. We assume that one of the parties in the contractual
relationship is unable to observe everything that happens in the game when played by the other
party. This implies that contracts are incomplete and we show that such incompleteness restricts
the set of equilibrium outcomes to a subset of Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game without
contracts. Introducing renegotiation, in general, imposes further constraints and in some games
implies that only subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes can be supported. However, there is a
largeclass of games in which non-subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes can also be supported,
and hence, third-partycontracts still havestrategic implications even whenthey arerenegotiable.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, C78, D86, L13.
Keywords: Third-Party Contracts, Strategic Delegation, Incomplete Contracts, Renegotiation.
∗An earlier version of this paper has been circulated under the title “Delegation with Incomplete and Renegotiable Con-
tracts.” We thank Larry Samuelson, seminar participants at University of Brescia, University of British Columbia, Bilkent
University, and the workshop on Markets and Contracts at CORE for useful comments. This research has been supported
by TÜB˙ ITAK Grant No. 106K317.
†Corresponding author: Department of Economics, Koç University, Rumelifeneri Yolu, Sariyer 34450, Istanbul, Turkey.
E-mail: lkockesen@ku.edu.tr.1 Introduction
As it has been so eloquently illustrated by Schelling (1960), contracts with third parties may have an
effect on the outcome of a strategic interaction and therefore could be used as a commitment device.
Underthe assumption that contracts are observableand non-renegotiable,the previous literature has
formally illustrated this possibility in many settings. Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), and
Sklivas (1987) analyze the effects of managerialcompensation contracts on product market competi-
tion, and show that such contracts can provide a strategic advantage.1 Brander and Lewis (1986) do
the same for debt contracts, whereas Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Snyder (1996) study optimal
ﬁnancial contracts when there is a threat of predation by a “deep-pocket” incumbent. Spencer and
Brander (1983), Brander and Spencer (1985), and Eaton and Grossman (1986) study strategic design
of trade and industrial policies when ﬁrms compete in international markets.
Each one of these models falls into one of two possible categories of games that third-party con-
tracts may induce. In delegation games, a player signs a contract that speciﬁes an outcome contin-
gent transfer to an agent, who in turn plays the game in place of the (principal) player. For example,
in Fershtman and Judd (1987) the owner of a ﬁrm signs a compensation contract with a manager,
who in turn chooses the output level in the Cournot game that follows. In games with side contracts,
the player signs a contract with a third-party but does not delegate the play of the game. In Brander
and Lewis (1986), for example, the ﬁrm signs a debt contract with a lender and then participates in
quantity competition.
Fershtman,Judd, and Kalai(1991), Polo and Tedeschi (2000), and Katz (2006) prove different “folk
theorems” for some classes of delegation games under observable and non-renegotiable contracts.2
The effects of unobservable and non-renegotiable third-party contracts are also well-understood.
Within the context of delegation games, Katz (1991) showed that the Nash equilibrium outcomes of
a game with and without delegation are identical. Koçkesen and Ok (2004) and Koçkesen (2007) ad-
dressed the same question within the context of extensive form games and showed that all (and only)
Nash equilibrium outcomes of the original game can be supported as a sequential equilibrium out-
come of the delegation game. In particular, they showed that outcomes that are not subgame perfect
in the original game may arise as a sequential equilibrium outcome of the induced delegation game,
i.e., unobservable contracts may have a strategic effect as long as they are non-renegotiable.3
Non-renegotiablecontractsyieldequilibriumoutcomesthatdifferfromthesubgameperfectequi-
librium outcome of the original game by inducing suboptimal behavior (from the perspective of the
preferences in the original game) at certain points in the game. These points must be off the equi-
librium path, since otherwise the player and the third partycould increase the total surplus available
to them by inducing optimal play. Therefore, if the game ever reaches such a point, they will have an
incentive to renegotiate the existing contract. This implies that, if renegotiation takes place without
1Koçkesen, Ok, and Sethi (2000) extend these results to more general classes of games.
2Prat and Rustichini (2003) and Jackson and Wilkie (2005) analyze related models in which players can write action
contingent contracts before the game is played. However, in Prat and Rustichini (2003) there are multiple principals and
agents and principals can contract with any agent, whereas in Jackson and Wilkie (2005) any player can write a contract
with any other. Unlike in the literature mentioned in the text, in these papers contractual relationships are not exclusive
and the focus is on the efﬁciency properties of the equilibrium set. Also related is Bhaskar (2008), in which players need to
pay a price to a supplier in order to play certain actions that are controlled by this supplier.
3Using an example, Katz (1991) also showed that the equivalence between the equilibrium outcomes of games with
and without delegation does not hold if one uses reﬁnements of Nash equilibrium. Likewise, Fershtman and Kalai (1997)
showed that any outcome of an ultimatum bargaininggame can be supported as a trembling hand perfect equilibrium.
1any friction, only the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the original game can be supported.
In other words, renegotiable third-partycontracts have no strategic effect.
Therefore, the question at hand becomes interesting only when there are frictions in the renego-
tiation process. In this paper we analyze the strategic design of unobservable and renegotiable third-
party contracts in an environment where such a friction arises quite naturally: We assume that the
player who does not participate in the actual play of the game – the principal in delegation games
andthe third partyin games with side contracts– is unable to observe everythingthathappensin the
game.4 Therefore, contracts can be made contingent only on a partition of the set of outcomes of the
underlying game, and are incomplete in this sense. For example, a bank may be able to observe only
the level of capacity expansion made by the ﬁrm to which it lends, but not those made by this ﬁrm’s
competitors. Similarly, a seller may be able to observe whether an item has been sold by his agent or
not, but not the exact price at which the transaction has occurred; a government may observe only
the production level of its domestic ﬁrm, but not that of the foreign competitor. In these scenarios,
the player who actually plays the game may not be able to credibly signal the existence of a mutually
beneﬁcial contract and his renegotiation attempt may fail. Motivated by this observation we ask and
answer the following question in the current paper: Which outcomes can be supported in games with
unobservableand renegotiablethird-partycontracts when these contracts are incomplete?
Welimitouranalysistoﬁnitetwo-stagegames,inwhichplayer1movesﬁrstbychoosinganaction
a1 ∈ A1, and after observing a1, player 2 chooses an action a2 ∈ A2. Let us call this game the original
game. In the induced game with third-party contracts, player 2 and a third party agree on a contract
f : A2 → R, which speciﬁes a transfer between them as a function of a2. Note that in delegation
games it is the agent who plays the action a2, whereas in games with side contracts it is player 2. In
essence, we assume that the player who does not actually play the original game (the passive player)
cannot observe a1 at any time and hence contracts are incomplete in the sense that they specify
a transfer as a function of a2, rather than (a1,a2). The contract is unobservable to player 1, who
chooses an action a1, after which the active player (the agent or player 2) decides whether to end the
game by choosing an action a2 or offer a new contract g : A2 →R to the passive player (player 2 or the
third party, respectively). The passive player has to decide whether to accept g or not, without being
informed about a1. Our objective is to characterize the set of outcomes of the original game that can
besupportedina perfectBayesian equilibrium (PBE)of theinduced game withthird-partycontracts.
Therefore, in our setting, where the only friction in the renegotiation process is the inability of
the passive player to observe everyhistory, contract incompleteness is a necessarycondition for sup-
portingoutcomesthatarenotsubgame perfectequilibrium outcomes oftheoriginalgame. However,
contract incompleteness itself brings about interesting issues that are independent of the existence
of renegotiation opportunities. Supporting an outcome in a PBE of the game with third-party con-
tracts depends on the ability of writing a contract that gives proper incentives to the active player to
play certain strategies. When contracts are complete, as in Koçkesen and Ok (2004) and Koçkesen
(2007), ﬁnding such contracts is relatively easy, as incentive compatibility does not arise as a bind-
ing constraint. When contracts are incomplete, however, only incentive compatible strategies can be
supported. We analyze this question in section 5.1 and show that, if payoff functions exhibit increas-
ingdifferences, thenonly(andall)theNash equilibria oftheoriginalgameinwhich player2’sstrategy
4Katz (1991) wastheﬁrstto considerthisscenariowithinthecontextof anultimatumbargaininggameand providedthe
initial motivation for this research.
2is increasing can be supported.
As we show in section 5.2, renegotiation imposes further constraints on outcomes that can be
supported. In that section, we completely characterize contract-strategypairs thatare renegotiation-
proof and give necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for a strategy to be renegotiation-proof. In section
6we applyourresultstoanenvironmentthatiscommon tomanyeconomically relevant games, such
astheStackelbergandultimatumbargaininggames, andcompletely characterizethesetofoutcomes
that can be supported with incomplete and renegotiation-proof contracts.
Previousliteraturehasidentiﬁed two scenarios, which arecomplementarytoours, inwhich rene-
gotiable contracts mayhave a commitment value: (1) games in which there is exogenous asymmetric
informationbetween the player and the third party(Dewatripont (1988) andCaillaud, Jullien, and Pi-
card (1995)); and (2) two-stage games with nontransferable utilities (Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1993)).
Dewatripont (1988) analyzes an entry-deterrence game in which the incumbent signs a contract
withalaborunionbeforethegamebegins. Apotentialentrantobservesthecontractandthendecides
whether to enter or not. Renegotiation takes place after the entry decision is made, during which
the union offers a new contract to the incumbent, who has by this time received a payoff relevant
private information. The paper shows that commitment effects exist in such a model and may deter
entry. This is similar to our model in that the original game is a two-stage game and renegotiation
happens after player 1 (the entrant) chooses his action. However, in his model the friction in the
renegotiation process arises from an exogenously given asymmetric information, whereas in ours
it comes from the inability of the passive player to observe player 1’s move. Furthermore, unlike
Dewatripont, we analyze arbitrary two-stage games, which enables us to identify conditions on the
supportable outcomes in terms of the primitives of the original game.
In Caillaud et al. (1995), unlike in our model, the original game is a simultaneous move game.
The game with third-party contracts begins by the player (the principal) offering a publicly observ-
able contract to a third-party (the agent), which may be renegotiated secretly afterwards. After the
renegotiation stage, the agent receives a payoff relevant information, after which he may decide to
quit. If he does not quit, the agent and the outside party (which is another principal-agent pair)
simultaneously choose their actions and the game ends. Their main question is whether publicly an-
nounced contracts, which may be secretly renegotiated afterwards, can have a commitment value.
They show that the answer to this question depends on whether the original game exhibits strategic
complementarity or substitutability and whether there are positive or negative externalities.
Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1993) also analyze a model in which the original game is a two-stage
game and the initial contract can be renegotiated after player 1 chooses an action. However, in their
model player 1’s action is contractible and observable, but utility is not transferable between player
2 and the third-party. They show that, in a certain class of games, contracts with third parties have a
commitment effect, even when they are renegotiable.5
Next section presents two simple games, one of which illustrates that non-subgame perfect out-
comes can be supported with incomplete and renegotiable contracts, while the other one shows that
thisisnottrueingeneral. Therefore, characterizationofequilibrium outcomes thatcanbesupported
withsuch contractsseems tobeaninterestingmatter. Sections 5and6dealwiththisquestion ingen-
eral two-stage games and Section 7 does the same using intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps (1987)) as
5Similarly, Snyder (1996) studies the commitment effects of renegotiable ﬁnancial contracts in a model with non-
transferable utility, where the non-transferability arises from capital market imperfections.
3the equilibrium concept. Section 8 concludes with some remarks and open questions, while section
9 contains the proofs of our results.
2 Examples and Motivation
Inthissection we analyzetwo simple games, anultimatumbargainingandasequentialbattle-of-the-
sexesgame, each of which hasa unique subgame perfectequilibrium. We will show that renegotiable
contracts can support a Nash equilibrium outcome that is not perfect in the bargaining game, while
only the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome can be supported in the battle-of-the-sexesgame. As
wehavementionedinsection 1, agame withthird-partycontractscould taketheformofadelegation
game or a game with side contracts. To facilitate the exposition of theexamples in thissection we will
use the framework of a game with side contracts. In other words, we will assume that player 2 signs
a contract with a third-party before the game begins, and then plays the game herself. Also, we will
give all the bargaining power to player 2 in the contractual phase. As it will become apparent later on
both of these assumptions are inconsequential for our main results.
ULTIMATUM BARGAINING
Consider a simple ultimatum bargaining game in which player 1 moves ﬁrst, by choosing the
action L or R, after which player 2 moves by choosing l or r. The payoffs corresponding to each
outcome are given in the game tree in Figure 1, where the ﬁrst number is player 1’s payoff and the
second number player 2’s.
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Figure 1: Ultimatum Bargaining Game
The unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this game is (L,rr), i.e., player 1 plays L and
player 2 plays r after both L and R. There is another Nash equilibrium of this game given by (R,lr).
Thisequilibriumgivesplayer2ahigherpayoffthandoesthesubgameperfectequilibrium, andhence
if she could commit to the strategy lr in a credible way she would do so.
Now consider thefollowing game with third-partycontracts. Player 2offersacontractto aneutral
third party, which speciﬁes a transfer from player 2 to the third partyas a function of the contractible
outcomes of the game. The third party may either accept or reject the contract offer. If he accepts,
player 1 and player 2 play the game, player 2 receives the game payoff minus the transfer speciﬁed
by the contract and the third party receives the transfer. If he rejects, then the transfer is zero and
the third party receives a ﬁxed payoff δ, while player 1 and 2 receive some small payoff.6 The set of
6Alternatively,wecould assumethat in caseof rejection player1 and 2 play thegame withno contractualobligations. As
long as δ is small enough this would not change the analysis that follows.
4perfectBayesian equilibrium outcomesofthisgamediffersdependinguponthecharacteristicsofthe
contracts.
If contractsareobservable, non-renegotiable, andcomplete, in thesense thatthetransferscanbe
madeconditional on the entireset ofoutcomes, thenthe unique PBE outcome of the game is (R,r). A
contractthat paysthe thirdpartyδ if the outcome is (L,l)or (R,r)andpays more than1+δ otherwise
is a possible equilibrium contract that achieves this outcome. This is nothing but another illustration
of the commitment value of observable, non-renegotiable, and complete contracts.
If contracts are unobservable, then the SPE outcome of the original game, i.e., (L,r), is also an
equilibriumoutcomeofthegame, inadditionto(R,r). Thisisanexampleillustratingthemainresults
in Koçkesen and Ok (2004) and Koçkesen (2007) which state that all Nash equilibrium outcomes can
be supported with unobservable (but complete and non-renegotiable) contracts.
If contracts can be renegotiated after the game begins, but they are complete, then the unique
equilibrium outcome of the delegation game is the SPE outcome of the original game, irrespective
of whether contracts are observable or unobservable. The reason is simple: The only way a non-SPE
outcome can be supported is through player 2 playing l after player 1 plays L, which is sequentially
irrational from the perspective of player 2’s preferences in the original game. Therefore, if player 1
plays L, player 2 and the third party have an incentive to renegotiate the contract so that under the
new contract player 2 plays r. In other words, in anyPBE, player 2 must play r after anyaction choice
of player 1, and hence player 1 must play L.
The conclusion is entirely different if the third party can observe player 2’s action, but not that
of player 1. This implies that feasible contracts are incomplete, i.e., they can specify transfers condi-
tional on only player 2’s actions but not player 1’s actions. We will show that the non-SPE outcome
(R,r) is an equilibrium outcome of the induced game with third-party contracts, even if these con-
tracts can be renegotiated.7 To this end let us specify the renegotiation process as an explicit game
form: After player 1 plays, player 2 decides whether to renegotiate by offering a new contract to the
third party or not. If she does not offer a contract she chooses an action and the game ends. If she
offers a new contract, then the third party either accepts or rejects it, after which player 2 chooses
an action and the game ends. If the new contract offer is accepted, then the payoffs are determined
according to the new contract, while if rejected, they are determined according to the old contract.
The crucial assumption is that the third partycannot observe player 1’s action at any time.
Thefollowing isaPBE ofthisgame. Player 2offersthecontract f thattransfersδto thethirdparty
if she plays r, and transfers δ−1 if she plays l. The third party accepts any contract that gives him an
expected payoff of at least δ; player 1’s beliefs put probability 1 on f and he plays R; player 2 chooses
not to renegotiate f and plays l following L and r following R. In the event of an out-of-equilibrium
renegotiation offer after f , the third partybelieves that player 1 has played R and rejects any contract
that transfers him less than δ. Note that in this equilibrium player 2’s payoff is 3−δ, which implies
that as long as δ< 2, player 2 prefers to sign such a contract even if she has the option of playing the
game without a contract.
Few remarks are in order about this example. First, notice that, in the above equilibrium, player 2
plays l after L, which is not a best response in the original game. Therefore, one may suspect that al-
thoughthecontractspeciﬁed inthepreviousparagraphisoptimal, it maybeweakly dominatedbyan
alternative contract that leads to best response behavior, i.e., playing r, after both L and R. Consider
7This has been ﬁrst observed by Katz (1991) for the ultimatum bargaininggame.
5such a contract, say g, and note that incentive compatibility implies g(l)≥ g(r)−1 (otherwise player
2would play l afterL). Furthermore,we need to have g(r)≥δ, forotherwise thethird partywould re-
ject g and player 2 would obtain some small payoff. Therefore, g(r)≥δ= f (r) and g(l)≥δ−1= f (l),
and thus, for any outcome of the game, player 2’s payoff after f is at least as large as her payoff after
g, which shows that f is not weakly dominated by any contract.8
Second, we assumed that the third party accepts any contract that gives him an equilibrium pay-
off of at least δ. In particular, we allowed the contract to pay him less than δ under some, out-of-
equilibrium, circumstances. One might ﬁnd this unreasonable on the grounds that if player 1 or
player 2 makes a mistake in the game that ensues, the third party may end up with a payoff that is
smaller than δ, and therefore he would reject such a contract. One way to address this concern is
to model the individual rationality constraint of the third party so that he requires a payment of at
least δ for every action player 2 might take. This would not change the set of outcomes that can be
supported by renegotiable contracts, but may affect how the equilibrium surplus is shared between
player 2 and the third party. For example, the least costly such contract that supports the outcome
(R,r) would be given by f (l) = δ and f (r) = 1+δ, in which case the equilibrium payoff of player 2
would be 2−δ, rather than 3−δ.9
Third, in the equilibrium constructed above, the third party believes that player 1 has played R
afterany out-of-equilibrium renegotiation offer. This might be regarded unreasonable, for there may
be contracts that are suboptimal for player 2 to offer after R, but not after L. Therefore, one might
want to restrict beliefs to L aftersuch offers. This would be nothingbut an application of the intuitive
criterion (Cho and Kreps(1987)). It is easy to show that the outcome (R,r) can also be supported in
an equilibrium that satisﬁes the intuitive criterion. More generally, in section 7 we show that all our
results go through with minor modiﬁcations if we were to adopt this stronger notion of equilibrium.
Fourth, we have to note that unobservability of player 1’s actions during the renegotiation phase
does not necessarily imply that contractsare incomplete. These actions may be observed, or become
veriﬁable by some other means, at the end of the game, in which case the contracts would in fact be
complete. Conversely, even if player 1’s actions are observed by both parties at all times, they may be
unveriﬁable, which would render the contracts incomplete. In our analysis above, and in the rest of
the paper, we assume that player 1’s actions are unobservable by the third partyduringthe game and
remain unveriﬁable throughout. If this were not the case, the outcome (R,r) could not be supported
by renegotiable contracts.
SEQUENTIAL BATTLE-OF-THE-SEXES
Consider now the sequential battle-of-the-sexes game given in Figure 2. This game also has a
unique SPE, given by (L,lr) and another Nash equilibrium, (R,rr). It can be shown easily that the
unique equilibrium outcome of the induced game with third-party contracts is (R,r) if the contracts
are observable, non-renegotiable, and complete, whereas the SPE outcome (L,l) can also be sup-
ported if contracts are unobservable. If contracts are complete and renegotiable, then only the SPE
outcome can be supported. All these observations are in line with those made for the ultimatum
bargaining game.
8Indeed, Proposition 1 of Fershtman and Kalai (1997) can be adapted to prove that the outcome supported by f , i.e.,
(R,r), is a trembling hand perfect equilibrium outcome.
9Another way would be to transfer some of the bargaining power to the third party so that in equilibrium he receives
more than δ. If, for example, δ ≤ 0.5, then f (r) = 1.5 and f (l) = 0.5 would support the same outcome in a way that always
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Figure 2: Battle-of-the-Sexes Game
However, the conclusion differs drastically from that in the ultimatum bargaining example if we
assume that contracts are renegotiable and incomplete. In this game only the SPE outcome can be
supported, while in ultimatum bargaining a non-SPE outcome could also be supported.
Let us prove that the Nash equilibrium outcome (R,r) cannot be supported by renegotiable con-
tracts. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists a PBE of the delegation game that supports this
outcome. Let f : {l,r} → R be the equilibrium contract that speciﬁes the transfer to be made from
player 2 to the third party. For this outcome to be supported, player 2 must be playing r after both
actions. Also, in equilibrium, player 2 must extract all the surplus, and hence f (r)=δ. Now consider
the renegotiation offer by player 2 given by g(l) = g(r) = δ+0.5 after player 1 plays L. Note that the
third party does not know which action has been played by player 1 when faced with this renegotia-
tion offer. If he accepts g, he will receive a payoff of δ+0.5 irrespective of player 1’s action. If, on the
other hand, he rejects it, he believes that player 2 will play r after any action by player 1 and hence
he will receive a payoff of δ.10 Therefore, whatever his beliefs are regarding player 1’s action, he has
an incentive to accept this renegotiation offer. Furthermore, player 2 has an incentive to make such
an offer after player 1 plays L since under f her expected payoff is −δ, whereas under g her expected
payoff is −δ+0.5. This establishes that there is no PBE that supports the outcome (R,r) with renego-
tiable contracts. Indeed, the unique outcome that can be supported in this case is the SPE outcome
of the original game, i.e., (L,l).
Inthissection we presentedtwogames thataresuperﬁciallysimilar butforwhich delegation with
renegotiable contracts gives completely different results. In the rest of the paper we will provide an
answer to why this is the case and characterize outcomes that can be supported with renegotiable
contracts in arbitrarytwo-stage extensive form games.
3 The Model
Our analysis starts with a two-player extensive form game, which we call the original game. We then
allow one of the players to sign a contract with a third party before the game begins and call this new
gives the third party at least δ.
10Here, andin therest ofthepaper, werestrictplayer2’s strategyin thegameto remainthesame ifher renegotiationoffer
is rejected. Thisis whatallows us tostatethatthethirdpartybelieves player2 will play r if herejects g. Otherwise, outcome
(R,r) could also be supported in equilibrium, which would involve a change in player 2’s behavior as a result of a failed
attempt to change the contract. Since one of our objectives is to identify conditions under which non-subgame perfect
outcomes can be supported by renegotiation-proof contracts, we disregard equilibria in which this happens as a result of
arbitrary changes in behavior that the mere possibility of renegotiationintroduces.
7game the game with third-party contracts. The contracts specify a transfer between the player and
the third party as a function of the contractible outcomes of the original game. After the contract is
signed, the game itself may be played by either the third party, in which case we have a delegation
game, or by the original player herself, in which case we have a game with side contracts. Although,
forthe sake of concreteness, we will use theframework of games with side contracts, ourmain results
go through for delegation games as well.
We aim to characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game with third party contracts in re-
lation with those of the original game. We are particulary interested in whether the induced game
with contracts has equilibrium outcomes that are not equilibrium outcomes in the original game,
i.e., whether third-party contracts “matter”.
As we have seen in the previous section, the nature of the contract space and whether we allow
for renegotiation of the contracts during the play of the game is crucial in our query. Previous liter-
ature has analyzed this question under the assumption of complete and non-renegotiable contracts,
which may be observable or unobservable by outside parties. Our focus, in contrast, is on contracts
that can be renegotiated at any point in a costless and secret manner. This immediately implies that
contractsareunobservable, since theycan be renegotiatedbefore thegame begins. If we also assume
that contracts are complete, i.e., the contractible outcomes are all the outcomes of the original game,
and there are no frictions in the renegotiation process, such as asymmetric information between the
contracting parties, third-party contracts cannot “alter” the set of equilibrium outcomes of the origi-
nalgame. Therefore, onehastointroducesomesortoffrictionintotherenegotiationprocess tomake
the analysis interesting.
We analyze a model in which the friction arises from the assumption that one of the contracting
parties cannot observe all the histories of the original game when it is played by the other party. In
other words, we assume that in games with side contracts, the third party, and in delegation games
the principal, is unable to observe everything that happens in the game. We believe that this is a nat-
ural environment to consider. For example, the principal may loose the ability to perfectly monitor
the play of the game once she delegates the play to an agent, or a bank may not be able to observe
everything that matters to the ﬁrm it lends to. In any case, we think that the resulting model is quite
rich and introduces new dimensions into the analysis of contracts in strategic settings, such as in-
completeness and moral hazard.
The assumption that one of the contracting parties cannot observe every history in the game im-
plies thatmonetarytransferscannot be conditioned on everyterminalhistoryof thegame andhence
contracts must be incomplete.11 Furthermore, if contracting parties cannot observe each other’s ac-
tions perfectly, then moral hazard becomes an issue in contract design. In this paper we focus on
incompleteness, leaving the analysis of issues associated with moral hazard to future work.
Contract incompleteness in our setting, therefore, is a necessary condition for obtaining non-
trivialresultsregardingtheeffectsofrenegotiation. However, incompletenessintroducesnovelissues
into the analysis and is interesting in itself. The set of equilibrium outcomes that can be attained in
gameswith third-partycontractsdependson theability of thecontractsto give theright incentivesto
play certain actions. Incentive compatibility is satisﬁed in a trivial way in models with complete con-
tracts (such as the one in Koçkesen and Ok (2004)). However, as we will see later on, incentive com-
patibility becomes a binding constraint in a model with incomplete contracts and obtaining sharp
11As we noted before, we assume that player 1’s actions remain unveriﬁablethroughoutthe game.
8results requires imposing further structure on the model, such as assuming that payoff functions ex-
hibit increasing differences.
The main intuition behind our results is best seen in a simple model in which the original game
hasonlytwo stages: Player 1moves ﬁrstandplayer 2second. Limiting player1’s move toonlytheﬁrst
stage makes formulating the model, e.g., introducing an order structure on the set of histories in the
game and deﬁning increasing differences, much easier and renders the results more transparent. For
these reasons, we restrict the analysis to two-stage games.
Limiting the analysis to two-stage games simpliﬁes the analysis further as we may, without loss
of generality, assume that only the second mover can sign contracts with third parties. Third-party
contractsintroduce equilibrium outcomes thatarenot equilibrium outcomes in theoriginalgame by
inducing sequentially irrational play (from the perspective of the preferences in the original game) at
informationsetsthatarenotreachedinequilibrium. Sinceplayer1movesonlyonce, atthebeginning
of the game, allowing him to delegate would not change the set of equilibrium outcomes at all.12
In light of these observations, we deﬁne the original game, denoted G, as a two-player ﬁnite ex-
tensive form game with perfect information. We assume that this game is composed of two stages:
Player 1 chooses a1 ∈ A1, and player 2, after observing a1, chooses a2 ∈ A2, where A1 and A2 are ﬁnite
sets. Payoff function of player i ∈{1,2} is given by ui : A →R, where A = A1× A2.
The game with incomplete and non-renegotiable third-party contracts, denoted Γ(G), is a three
player extensive form game described by the following sequence of events:
StageI. Player 2 offers a contract f : A2 →R to a third party.
StageII. The third party accepts (denoted y) or rejects (denoted n) the contract.
1. In case of rejection the game ends, the third party receives a ﬁxed payoff of δ ∈ R, and
player 1 and 2 receive −∞.13
2. In case of acceptance, the game goes to Stage III.
StageIII. Player 1 chooses an action a1 ∈ A1 (without observing the contract), player 2 observes a1.
StageIV. Player 2 chooses an action a2 ∈ A2.
Since we assume that if the contract offer is rejected, the game ends and players 1 and 2 receive
very small payoffs, the contract offer is accepted in all equilibria. Therefore, we will, for the sake of





















where v3 is the payoff function of the third party.
12Of course, as it was shown in Koçkesen (2007), in games with more than two stages this is not the case.
13Alternatively, we could assume that if the third party rejects an offer, then the original game is played without a con-
tract. However, this assumption introduces additional notation and technical details without changing our results in any
substantiveway.
9The above formulation assumes that after the contract is signed, it is player 2 who actually plays
the game, i.e., we have a game with side contracts. In a delegation game, it is the third party who
playsthe game, in which case player 2’s payoff functionwould be given by f (a2), andthe third party’s
by u2(a1,a2)− f (a2).14 As we have indicated before, all our results go through without modiﬁcation
irrespective of who plays the game, but for ease of exposition we assume that the game is with side
contracts.
We also assume that player 2 has the entire bargaining power during the contracting phase. This
assumption has no effect on our results regarding the set of equilibrium outcomes, but clearly has
implications regarding the equilibrium payoff of player 2. Also note that δ could represent either the
outside option of the third party, such as that of an agent or a lender, or could be used to model some
other constraint on the transfers, such as the upper bound on the amount of export subsidy.
The game is with renegotiable contracts if the contracting parties can renegotiate the contract
after Stage III and before Stage IV. We assume that renegotiation can be initiated only by the player
who actually plays the game. However, as it will become apparent after we introduce our concept of
renegotiation-proofness, theresultsremainintactiftherenegotiation processisinitiated bytheother





StageIII(i). Player 2 either offers a new contract g ∈ C to the third party or chooses an action a2. In





StageIII(ii). If player 2 offers a new contract, the third party (without observing a1) either accepts
(denoted y) or rejects (denoted n) the offer.
If the third party rejects the renegotiation offer g, then player 2 chooses a2 ∈ A2 and the outcome









. This completes the description of the delegation game with incomplete and
renegotiablecontracts, which we denote as ΓR(G).
A behavior strategy for player i ∈ {1,2,3} is deﬁned as a set of probability measures βi ≡ {βi[I] :
I ∈ Ii}, where Ii is the set of information sets of player i and βi[I] is deﬁned on the set of actions
availableatinformationset I. Onemaywriteβi[h]forβi[I]foranyhistoryh ∈ I. Byasystemofbeliefs,
we mean a set µ ≡ {µ[I] : I ∈ Ii for some i}, where µ[I] is a probability measure on I. A pair (β,µ) is
calledanassessment. Anassessment (β,µ)issaid tobeaperfectBayesianequilibrium(PBE)if(1) each
player’s strategy is optimal at every information set given her beliefs and the other players’ strategies;
and (2) beliefs at every information set are consistent with observed histories and strategies.15
4 The Query
Wewill limit our analysis topurebehavior strategies, andhence a strategyproﬁle ofthe originalgame
G is given by (b1,b2)∈ A1× A
A1
2 . For any behavior strategy proﬁle (b1,b2) in G, we say that an assess-
ment (β,µ) in Γ(G) induces (b1,b2) if in Γ(G) player 1 plays according to b1 and, after the equilibrium
14In a delegation game, this payoff speciﬁcation would be reasonable if the third party can inherit player 2’s preferences
oncethegameisdelegated tohim. Consider, forexample, aseller whodelegatesthesaleofanitemtoanagentandsuppose
that she cannot observe the actual price at which the item is sold. In this case the contract would specify a payment from
theagenttotheseller contingentuponwhetherasalehasoccurredornot. Ifthesellerandtheagentcareonlyaboutmoney,
then the above payoff speciﬁcation would indeed be the appropriateone.
15See Fudenberg and Tirole(1991) for a precise deﬁnition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
10contract, player 2 plays according to b2. Note that in ΓR(G), player 2 may choose an action a2 ∈ A2
either without renegotiating the initial contract or after attempting renegotiation. Therefore, an as-
sessment (β,µ) in ΓR(G) may induce a behavior strategy proﬁle (b1,b2) in G in these two different
ways.
We restrict our attention to equilibria in which the equilibrium contract is not renegotiated. As
Beaudryand Poitevin (1995) point out, this is necessary for renegotiation to have anybite, as one can
always replicate an equilibrium outcome of the game without renegotiation by making player 2 offer
an initial contract that is accepted only because it is going to be renegotiated later on.16 This leads to
the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 (Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria). A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (β∗,µ∗) of ΓR(G) is
renegotiation-proof if the equilibrium contract is not renegotiated after any a1.
Note that the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria is actually a subset of perfect Bayesian equi-
libria in which the equilibrium contract is not renegotiated. The latter would be deﬁned so that the
equilibrium contract isnot renegotiatedafteranyaction of player 1thatgives him a higherpayoff un-
dera renegotiatedcontract thantheequilibrium payoff. However, workingwith this weakernotion of
renegotiation-proofness would only introduce additional complexity into our presentation without
changing the main results in any interesting way.
Deﬁnition 2. A strategy proﬁle (b1,b2) of the original game G can be supported with incomplete and
non-renegotiablecontracts if there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Γ(G) that induces (b1,b2).
Similarly, a strategyproﬁle (b1,b2) of the original gameG can be supportedwithincompleteand rene-
gotiable contracts if there exists a renegotiation-proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium of ΓR(G) that in-
duces (b1,b2).
Our main query can therefore be phrased as follows:
Which outcomes of a given original game can be supported with incomplete and renego-
tiable (or non-renegotiable)contracts?
Clearly, in our model, if an outcome can be supported with renegotiable contracts, it can also be sup-
ported with non-renegotiable contracts.17 Therefore, we start by characterizing the set of outcomes
that can be supported with non-renegotiable contracts before we analyze the restrictions imposed
by renegotiation. We should emphasize that Γ(G) is with unobservable but incomplete contracts.
The results provided in Koçkesen and Ok (2004) are valid only for games with complete contracts and
hencedo notprovide therelevantstartingpointforouranalysis. Applied tooursetting, Koçkesen and
Ok (2004) implies that every Nash equilibrium outcome can be supported with complete contracts,
whereas, aswewill seeinthenextsection, onlyasubsetofthesecanbesupportedwhenthecontracts
are incomplete.
5 Main Results
Inthissection we willprovide ananswertoourmainquery,ﬁrstforincompleteandnon-renegotiable
contracts and then for renegotiable contracts.
16See also Maskin and Tirole(1992) on this point.
17This claim is proved as (the [Only if]) part of Proposition2 in Section 9.
115.1 Incomplete and non-Renegotiable Contracts
Let G be an arbitrary original game and Γ(G) be the game with incomplete and non-renegotiable
third-partycontracts. We ﬁrst prove the following.
Proposition 1. A strategyproﬁle (b∗
1,b∗
2) ofG can be supportedwith incomplete and non-renegotiable
contractsif and only if
1. (b∗
1,b∗
2) is a Nash equilibriumofG










1)), for all a1,a′
1 ∈ A1.
Proposition 1provides necessaryandsufﬁcientconditions foranoutcome of anarbitraryoriginal
game to be supported with incomplete and non-renegotiable contracts. Condition 1 states that only
Nash equilibrium outcomes can be supported, which, as in Koçkesen and Ok (2004), follows from
sequentialrationalityofplayers1and2. Condition2simplystatesthatthethirdpartydoesnotreceive
rents in equilibrium, whereas condition 3 is the incentive compatibility constraint imposed by the
incompleteness of contracts.
Although Proposition 1 provides a complete characterization, it falls short of precisely identifying
the supportable outcomes in terms of the primitives of the original game. As it is standard in adverse
selection models, we can obtain a much sharper characterization if we impose an order structure on
A1 and A2 and assume that player 2’s payoff function v2 exhibits increasing differences. Given the
deﬁnition of v2, this is equivalent to assuming that u2 has increasing differences. To this end, let %1
be a linear order on A1 and%2 a linear order on A2, and denote their asymmetric partsby ≻1 and ≻2,
respectively.
Deﬁnition3(Increasing Differences). u2 : A1×A2 →Rissaidtohaveincreasingdifferencesin(%1,%2)
if a1 %1 a′
1 and a2 %2 a′




2). It is said to have
strictly increasing differences if a1 ≻1 a′
1 and a2 ≻2 a′










From now on, we restrict our analysis to games in which there exists a linear order %1 on A1 and
a linear order %2 on A2 such that u2 has strictly increasing differences in (%1,%2). We then have the
following result.
Theorem 1. A strategy proﬁle (b∗
1,b∗
2) of G can be supported with incomplete and non-renegotiable
contractsif and only if (b∗
1,b∗
2) is a Nash equilibriumofG and b∗
2 is increasing.
This result completely characterizes the strategy proﬁles that can be supported with incomplete
contracts and precisely identiﬁes the restrictions imposed by incompleteness. While earlier papers
showed that any Nash equilibrium of the original game can be supported by unobservable and com-
plete contracts, this result shows that only the subset of Nash equilibria in which the second player
plays an increasing strategy can be supported if, instead, contracts are incomplete.
12The reason why only increasing strategies of the second player can be supportedis verysimilar to
the reason why only increasing strategies can be supported in standard adverse selection models: If
the payoff function of player 2 exhibits increasing differences, then incentive compatibility is equiva-
lenttoincreasingstrategies. Thesetofactionsofplayer1, A1,playstheroleofthetypesetoftheagent
in standard principal-agent models. The fact that contracts cannot be conditioned on A1 transforms
themodelintoanadverseselection model, which, combined withincreasing differencesexhibitedby
u2(a1,a2)− f (a2), necessitates increasing strategies to satisfy incentive compatibility, i.e., condition 3
of Proposition 1. We prove sufﬁciency by using a theorem of the alternative.
We now move on to analyze the effects of renegotiable contracts. As we noted before, if contracts
are renegotiable and complete, then the only equilibrium that can be supported is the subgame per-
fect equilibrium of the original game. Therefore, for renegotiable contracts to have any effect on the
outcome of the game, they must be incomplete. However, as we have just seen, contract incomplete-
ness also acts as a restriction on the set of supportable outcomes. Therefore, our query to identify
outcomes that can be supported with renegotiable and incomplete contracts seems to be interesting.
The next section attacks precisely this problem.
5.2 Incomplete and Renegotiable Contracts
LetG beanarbitraryoriginalgame andΓR(G)betheinduced gamewithincomplete andrenegotiable
third-party contracts. As stated before we would like to identify the set of outcomes of G that can be
supported by renegotiation-proof perfect Bayesian equilibria of ΓR(G).
When faced with a renegotiation offer, the third party has to form beliefs regarding how player
2 would play under the new contract and compare his payoffs from the old and the new contracts
to decide whether to accept it or not. As we have seen in section 5.1, contract incompleteness im-
poses incentive compatibility constraints on the strategy of player 2, and therefore the third party
has to restrict his beliefs to strategies that are incentive compatible under the new contract. For fu-
ture reference, let us ﬁrst deﬁne incentive compatibility as a property of any contract-strategy pair
(f ,b2)∈C × A
A1
2 .
Deﬁnition 5 (Incentive Compatibility). (f ,b2)∈C × A
A1
2 is incentive compatible if
u2(a1,b2(a1))− f (b2(a1))≥u2(a1,b2(a′
1))− f (b2(a′
1)) for all a1,a′
1 ∈ A1.
To understand the constraints imposed by renegotiation-proofness suppose that (β,µ) is a rene-
gotiation-proof PBE of ΓR(G) and let f be the equilibrium contract and b∗
2 be the equilibrium strat-











1)) and g(b2(a1)) > f (b∗
2(a1)) for all a1. This implies that, after a′
1 is played,
player 2 will have an incentive to renegotiate and offer g and the third party will have an incentive
to accept it. This would contradict that (β,µ) is a renegotiation-proof PBE of ΓR(G). This leads to the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6 (Renegotiation-Proofness). We say that (f ,b∗
2) ∈C × A
A1
2 is renegotiation-proof if for all









there exists an a′





Again, the intuition behind this deﬁnition is clear: Whenever there is an a1 after which there is a
contract g and an incentive compatible continuation play b2 such that the contracting parties both
prefer g over f (i.e., (1) and (2) hold), there exists a belief of the third party under which it is optimal
to reject g, which is implied by (3).18
In a similar vein, we have the following deﬁnition for a renegotiation-proof strategy.
Deﬁnition 7 (Renegotiation-Proof Strategy). A strategy b2 ∈ A
A1
2 is renegotiation-proof if there exists
an f ∈C such that (f ,b2) is incentive compatible and renegotiation-proof.
Intuitively, Deﬁnition 7 seems to identify the conditions that b2 must satisfy to be induced by
a renegotiation-proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium of ΓR(G). The following result proves that this
intuition is correct.
Proposition 2. A strategyproﬁle (b∗
1,b∗
2) ofG can be supported withincomplete and renegotiablecon-
tracts if and only if (b∗
1,b∗
2) is a Nash equilibriumofG and b∗
2 is increasingand renegotiation-proof.
Unfortunately, it is difﬁcult to apply Deﬁnitions 6 and 7 directly to an arbitrary game to ascer-
tain the restrictions that renegotiation-proofness imposes on contracts and strategies. However, the
conditions themselves are all linear inequalities and we can use theorems of the alternative to un-
derstand these restrictions better in terms of the primitives of the original game. To this end, let the
number of elements in A1 be equal to n and order its elements so that an
1 %1 an−1
1 %1    a2
1 %1 a1
1. For
anycontract-strategypair (f ,b2), deﬁne fj = f (b2(a
j
1)), j =1,...,n, and let, with an abuse of notation,
f ∈Rn be the vector whose jth component is given by fj.
First, note that, under increasing differences, incentive compatibility of (g,b2) is equivalent to b2
being increasing and conditions (1) and (2) imply that u2(a1,b2(a1))>u2(a1,b∗
2(a1)). In other words,
condition (3) needs to be satisﬁed for every ai
1,i = 1,...,n, and increasing strategy that leads to a










Second, by Deﬁnition 6, (f ,b∗
2) is not renegotiation-proof if and only if there exist i and incentive
compatible (g,b2) such that u2(ai
1,b2(ai
1))− gi > u2(ai
1,b∗
2(ai
1))− fi and gj > fj for all j. When u2



















1 )), j =2,...,n
18One may ﬁnd this deﬁnition too weak as it allows the beliefs to be arbitrary following an off-the-equilibrium renegoti-
ation offer. A more reasonable alternative could be to require the beliefs to satisfy intuitivecriterion. In Section 7 we show
that our results go throughwith minor modiﬁcations when we adopt this strongerversion of renegotiation-proofness.
14We can write these inequalities in matrix form as Dg ≤U(b2), where D is a matrix of coefﬁcients and





















2) is not renegotiation-proof if and only if there exist i, b2, and ε∈Rn such that






These conditions can be written as [Ax ≫ 0,Cx ≥ 0 has a solution x], once the vector x and matri-
ces A and C are appropriately deﬁned. Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative (stated as Lemma 3 in
section 9) then implies that the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for being renegotiation-proof is
[A′y1+C′y2 = 0,y1 > 0,y2 ≥ 0 has a solution y1,y2] (See Lemma 4 in section 9). The fact that u2 has
increasing differences can then be used to prove the equivalence of this condition to the one stated
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. (f ,b∗
2) is renegotiation-proof if and only if for any i ∈ {1,2,...,n} and b2 ∈ B(i,b∗
2) there









U(b2)2j−1 ≤ fk − fi (5)









U(b2)2(j−1) ≤ fl − fi (6)
In order to apply this theorem directly to a given game and a strategy b∗
2 one would ﬁrst identify
the set of contracts under which player 2 has an incentive to play b∗
2, and then check if any of those
contracts satisﬁes the conditions of the theorem. It is best to illustrate this using the examples in-
troduced in Section 2. For both the ultimatum bargaining and sequential battle-of-the-sexes games,
deﬁne %1 and %2 so that R ≻1 L and r ≻2 l and note that u2 has strictly increasing differences in
(%1,%2).
ULTIMATUM BARGAINING
There are three Nash equilibria of the game: (L,rl), (L,rr), and (R,lr). The second one is the
uniqueSPEandithasthesameoutcomeastheﬁrst. Thethirdoneisnotsubgameperfect. Notice that
thelasttwoequilibriahaveincreasingb2 andhence,byTheorem1, canbesupportedwithincomplete
and non-renegotiable contracts. Since the SPE can be supported with renegotiable contracts as well,
the question is whether (R,lr)can be supported with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.19
Any equilibrium contract f that supports (R,lr) must satisfy the incentive compatibility con-
straint given by 1 ≤ f (r)− f (l) ≤ 3. Since player 2 is already best responding after R, a Pareto im-
19Clearly, if a contract supportsa SPE, it is renegotiation-proof as there is no a1 ∈ A1 such that (1) and (2) hold.
15proving renegotiation can happen only after L and it must lead to b2(L) = r. Incentive compatibility
implies that b2 is increasing, and therefore, b2(R)=r. From Theorem 2, (f ,b∗
2) is renegotiation-proof






2 and b2, this is equivalent to 1 ≤ f (r)− f (l). Since incentive compatibility holds
if 1 ≤ f (r)− f (l)≤ 3, we conclude that b∗
2 = lr can be supported with a renegotiation-proof contract
and hence (R,lr)can be supported with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
SEQUENTIAL BATTLE-OF-THE-SEXES
There are three Nash equilibria of the game: (L,ll), (L,lr), and (R,rr). The second one is the
uniqueSPE andithasthesameoutcome astheﬁrst. Thethirdoneisnotsubgame perfect. Allofthese
equilibria have an increasing b2 and hence can be supported with incomplete and non-renegotiable
contracts. The question again is whether the (non-subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium (R,rr) can be
supported with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
The only possibility for a Pareto improving renegotiation is after L and it must induce b2(L) = l.
Theorem 2 implies that if (f ,b∗





or u2(R,b2(R))+1≤ 0, which is impossible since u2(R,b2(R))≥ 0. We conclude that it is not possible
to support (R,rr) with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
Although Theorem 2 is quite powerful in applications, it would still be desirable to obtain general
results that involve only the primitives of the original game. In particular, we would like to obtain
conditions for a strategy b∗
2 to be supportable with incomplete and renegotiable contracts. Given
Proposition 2, thisrequiresidentifyingrenegotiation-proofstrategies, i.e., thoseforwhich thereexists
an f ∈ C such that (f ,b∗
2) is incentive compatible and renegotiation-proof. For any k,i ∈ {1,...,n},
incentive compatibility implies







Togetherwith Theorem 2, we thenhavethefollowing necessarycondition for b∗
2 beingrenegotiation-
proof: For any i =1,...,n and bi
2 ∈B(i,b∗
































In fact, again utilizing a theorem of the alternative (Gale’s theorem of inequalities), we can make this
condition tighter. To facilitate the exposition, we ﬁrst introduce the following deﬁnition.
16Deﬁnition 8. For any i = 1,...,n and b2 ∈B(i,b∗





























We then obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. A strategy b∗
2 ∈ A
A1
2 is renegotiation-proof only if for any i = 1,...,n and bi
2 ∈ B(i,b∗
2)
there is a blockingaction.20
However, this condition is not sufﬁcient for renegotiation-proofness and becomes sufﬁcient with
an additional condition on the blocking actions for different a1’s. More precisely,
Proposition 4. A strategy b∗
2 ∈ A
A1
2 is renegotiation-proof if for any i = 1,...,n and bi
2 ∈ B(i,b∗
2) there
is a blocking action m(bi





The conditions given in Propositions 3 and 4 coincide when player 1 has only two actions. There-
fore, Proposition 3 is a full characterization result for such games, including our running examples.
Let us use this proposition to show that b∗
2 = lr is renegotiation-proof in ultimatum bargaining ex-
ample. Let L = a1
1 and R = a2
1 and note that B(1,b∗
2)={rr} and B(2,b∗
2)= . Therefore, we only need
to check if there is a blocking action for i =1 and b2 =rr, the only candidate for which is R. Applying
(8), we get
u2(L,r)−u2(L,l)+u2(R,r)−u2(R,r)≤u2(R,r)−u2(R,l)
which is satisﬁed. We therefore conclude that b∗
2 =lr is renegotiation proof.
Now let us show that b∗
2 = rr is not renegotiation-proof in the battle-of-the-sexes game. In this
case, B(2,b∗
2) =   and B(1,b∗
2) = {ll,lr}. It is sufﬁcient to show that there is no blocking action for
i = 1 and b2 = lr. The only candidate for a blocking action is R and we need the following inequality
to be satisﬁed
u2(L,l)−u2(L,r)+u2(R,r)−u2(R,l)≤u2(R,r)−u2(R,r).
Obviously, this is not true and we conclude that b∗
2 =rr is not renegotiation-proof.
When A1 has more than two actions the condition stated in Proposition 3 is not sufﬁcient any-
more and obtaining a full characterization for such games requires introducing more structure into
the model. In the next section we do this for a large class of economically relevant games.
6 A Special Environment and Applications
In this section we analyze a class of games that includes many economic models, among which are
Stackelbergandentrygames,sequentialBertrandgameswithdifferentiatedproducts,andultimatum
bargaining. To deﬁne this class of games, take any original game G and consider the strategic form
game S(G)= ({1,2},(A1,A2),(u1,u2)), i.e., S(G) is the simultaneous move version of G. Let bri denote











17a selection from the best-response correspondence of player i in S(G), i.e., bri(a−i) ∈ BRi(a−i) for
all a−i ∈ A−i. Also, let NE(S(G)) be the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of S(G) and denote the





Deﬁnition9. u1 haspositiveexternality in%2 if a2 %2 a′
2 implies u1(a1,a2)≥u1(a1,a′
2) forall a1 ∈ A1.
Deﬁnition 10. u1 is single-peaked in %1 if for all br1 ∈ BR1 and a2 ∈ A2, br1(a2) %1 a′
1 %1 a1 implies
u1(a′
1,a2) ≥ u1(a1,a2) and a1 %1 a′
1 %1 br1(a2) implies u1(a′
1,a2) ≥ u1(a1,a2). Deﬁne single-peaked
u2 in a similar manner.
Deﬁnition 11. For any original game G, we say that NE(S(G)) is stable if, for any selection (br1,br2),
a1 %1 a
NE
1 implies a1 %1 br1(br2(a1)) and a1 -1 aNE
1 implies a1 -1 br1(br2(a1)).






















Let G denote the class of gamesG in which u1 and u2 are single-peaked, u2 has strictly increasing
differences in (%1,%2), u1 has positive externality, and NE(S(G)) is stable and non-empty.21 Also, let
ai = max%i Ai and ai = min%i Ai. The following result provides necessary and sufﬁcient conditions
for an outcome to be supported with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
Theorem 3. Let G ∈ G. An outcome (a∗
1,a∗
2) of G can be supported with incomplete and renegotiable
















In other words, in this environment outcomes in which player 1 plays an action that is “smaller”
than his smallest Nash equilibrium action (in the simultaneous move version of the original game)
cannot be supported. Conversely, any outcome in which player 1’s action is greater than his largest
Nash equilibrium action can be supported, as long as player 2 best responds to that action in a way
that condition (9) is satisﬁed.
Also note that, if S(G) has a unique Nash equilibrium, then the above proposition provides a full
characterization. In many games condition (9) is trivially satisﬁed for any (br1,br2), which implies
that, in this case, an outcome can be supported if and only if player 1’s action is greater than his
Nash equilibrium action in S(G) and player 2’s action is a best response to that. In fact, in such an
environment,renegotiation hasno biteatall. More precisely, thefollowing canbeprovedbyadapting
the proof of Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. Let G ∈ G, and suppose that S(G) has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, and that
a1 %1 aNE
1 impliesu1(a1,br2(a1))≥u1(a1,br2(a1))for allbr2 ∈BR2. Ifan outcome(a∗
1,a∗
2)ofG canbe
supported with incomplete contracts, then it can also be supported with incomplete and renegotiable
contracts.
21Clearly, if u2 has strictly decreasing differences and u1 has negative externality, the game is still a member of G.
18For example, consider a Stackelberggame in which ﬁrm 1 moves ﬁrst by choosing an output level
q1 ∈ Q1 and ﬁrm 2, after observing q1, chooses its own output level q2 ∈ Q2. We assume that Qi,
i =1,2, is a ﬁnitesubset of R+ and includes 0. Let p :R2
+ →R+ be themarket inverse demandfunction
and ci : R+ → R+ be the ﬁrm i’s cost function. We assume that ci is increasing, with ci(0) = 0, p
is decreasing, and p(q1,q2) = 0, if q1 = maxQ1 or q2 = maxQ2. Proﬁt function of ﬁrm i is given by
πi(q1,q2)= p(q1,q2)qi −ci(qi) and both ﬁrms are proﬁt maximizers.
Deﬁne the game G as follows: Let A1 =Q1 and A2 = {−q2 : q2 ∈Q2} and deﬁne %i on Ai as ai %i
a′
i ⇔ ai ≥ a′
i. Let the payoff functions be equal to the proﬁt functions, that is
u1(a1,a2)= p(a1,−a2)a1−c1(a1)
u2(a1,a2)= p(a1,−a2)(−a2)−c2(−a2)
for any (a1,a2) ∈ A1 × A2. The game G is strategically equivalent to the Stackelberg game deﬁned in
thepreviousparagraph,andu1 haspositive externality. Ifwe furtherassume thatthepayofffunctions
are single-peaked, u2 has strictly increasing differences, and the stability condition is satisﬁed, then







can be supported if and only if ﬁrm 1 obtains non-negative proﬁt, its output is at least as high as its
CournotNashequilibrium output,andthefollower’s outputisabestresponsetothat. Insuchagame,
therefore, ﬁrm 2 may beneﬁt from third-partycontracts, even when they are renegotiable.
Asanotherexample, consider anultimatumbargaininggame in which theset of possible offersis
A1 ={1,2,...,n},forsome integern >1, and A2 ={Y,N}. Leta1 %1 a′
1 ifandonlyif a1 ≥ a′
1 andY ≻2 N.
Supposethatiftheresponder(player2)acceptsanoffer a1,i.e., choosesY ,thentheproposer’s(player
1) payoff is n −a1 and that of the responder is a1, while if the responder rejects, i.e., chooses N, they
bothget zero payoff. Thisgame satisﬁesalltheassumptionsrequired forTheorem3, itssimultaneous
move version has a unique Nash equilibrium given by (1,Y ), and condition (9) is trivially satisﬁed.
Therefore, every offer can be supported with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
Finally, we should note that if u1 has strictly increasing differences as well as u2, then S(G) is a
supermodular game and hence it has a smallest and largest pure strategy Nash equilibria (Topkis
(1979)). Furthermore, it can be shown that NE(S(G)) is stable in the sense of Deﬁnition 11.23 There-
fore, if G is such that u1 and u2 have strictly increasing differences, are single-peaked, and u1 has
positive externality, thenG ∈G.
7 Strong Renegotiation-Proofness
One may object to our deﬁnition of renegotiation-proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium on the basis
that off-the-equilibrium beliefs during the renegotiation process are left free. In particular, after the
initial contract f and faced with an (off-the-equilibrium) renegotiation offer g, our deﬁnition allows
the beliefs of the third party to assign positive probability to any action a1. This enables us to con-
22For example, if the demand and cost functions are linear, then all of these conditions are satisﬁed.
23This assertionis proved in Section 9 as Lemma 10.
19struct a PBE in the proof of Proposition 2 in which the initial contract f is not renegotiated as long
as (f ,b∗
2) is renegotiation-proof as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 6. A plausible way to strengthen our deﬁni-
tion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium is to require that it satisﬁes the intuitive criterion as deﬁned
by Cho and Kreps (1987). When applied to our setting this criterion requires that beliefs put positive










1)). This leads to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 12 (Strong Renegotiation Proofness). We say that (f ,b∗
2) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is strongly renegotia-









there exists an a′

































1))}≤ fk − fi (14)


























1)). In this case, f (b∗
2(ak
1)) ≥ g(b2(ak
























Therefore, in this case a renegotiation-proof (f ,b∗
2) is also strongly renegotiation-proof. If, however,









1)), thena renegotiation-proof (f ,b∗
2) might
not be strongly renegotiation-proof.
Also, it is easy to show that Proposition 2 and Theorem 3 go through when “renegotiation-proof”
isreplacedwith“stronglyrenegotiation-proof,”whereasPropositions3and4gothroughwithaminor
modiﬁcation similar to that made for Theorem 2.
208 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we characterized outcomes that can be supported in games with incomplete and non-
renegotiable as well as renegotiable third-party contracts. We have seen that incompleteness of the
contracts restricts the outcomes that can be supported, in a natural way, to those in which the sec-
ond mover’s strategy is increasing (Theorem 1). Renegotiation imposes further constraints on these
outcomes (Theorem 2) that limit them to subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in some games.
Yet, there is a large class of games in which non-subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes can be sup-
ported even with renegotiable contracts, and hence third-party contracts still have a bite (Theorem
3). In particular, in an environment common to many economic models, such as the Stackelberg
and ultimatum bargaining games, any outcome in which player 1 plays an action that is larger than
his Nash equilibrium action in the simultaneous move version of the game and player 2 plays a best
response can be supported with incomplete and renegotiable contracts.
There are several directions along which the current work can be extended in interesting ways.
The most obvious of them is to consider more general information structures and contract spaces.
One interesting possibility is to assume that the third party can observe only an outcome in some
arbitrary outcome space Q and that only Q is contractible. The model is closed by assuming that
there is a function p : A1× A2 →Q such that p(q|a1,a2) is the probability of outcome q when (a1,a2)
is played in the game. This introduces moral hazard issues into the model and might change our
results in non-trivial ways. Another extension along similar lines would be a model in which player
2 has some payoff relevant information that is not available to the third-party. This is closer to a
standard adverse selection model but is embedded in a strategic environment.24 Characterization of
renegotiation-proof outcomes in either of these models is left for future work.
Throughout the analysis we assumed that the original game is a ﬁnite two-stage game in which
the second mover’s set of actions is the same after any choice by the ﬁrst mover. This allowed us to
formulate incentive compatibility and renegotiation-proofness as sets of linear inequalities, which
were relatively easy to manipulate and apply theorems of the alternative. A more technical extension
ofourworkwouldbetoconsiderarbitrarytwo-playerﬁniteextensiveformgames. However, adapting
the methods we used in the proofs to arbitrarygames is not straightforward and this extension is also
left for future work.
One important aspect of our paper is its use of theorems of the alternative to characterize incen-
tive compatibility and renegotiation-proofness. We believe that these methods have the potential
to be useful for models other than games with third-party contracts, such as characterizing rene-
gotiation-proof contracts in dynamic principal-agent models or in single-person dynamic decision
making problems with time-inconsistent preferences.
9 Proofs
In the game with incomplete and non-renegotiable contracts Γ(G), player 2 has an information set at
the beginning of the game, which we identify with the null history  , and an information set for each
(f ,a1) ∈ C × A1. Player 1 has only one information set, given by C , and player 3 has an information
24As we mentioned before, Dewatripont (1988) analyzes an example of such a model and shows that contracts can have
a commitment valueeven under renegotiation.
21set for each f ∈ C . In ΓR(G), player 2 has additional information sets corresponding to each history
(f ,a1,g,y) and (f ,a1,g,n) and player 3 has an additional information set of each (f ,g) ∈ C 2, which
we denote by I3(f ,g).
Proof of Proposition 1. [If] Let (b∗
1,b∗
2) be a Nash equilibrium ofG and f ′ satisfy the conditions of the
proposition. For any b2 ∈ A
A1

















2(a1), f = f ∗
∈argmaxa2u2(a1,a2)− f (a2), f  = f ∗
for any f ∈ C and a1 ∈ A1. Consider the assessment (β∗,µ∗) of Γ(G), where β∗




2[f ,a1] = b∗
2,f (a1) for all f ∈ C and a1 ∈ A1, and µ∗[C ](f ∗) = 1. It is easy to check that this
assessment induces (b∗
1,b∗
2) and is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Γ(G).
[Only if] Now, suppose that (b∗
1,b∗
2) can be supported. Then, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium (β∗,µ∗) that induces (b∗
1,b∗
2), i.e., β∗




2(a1) for all a1 ∈ A1. The
factthat(b∗
1,b∗
2)is aNash equilibrium ofG is adirect consequence of sequentialrationalityof players
1 and 2. We now show that f ∗ satisﬁes conditions 2 and 3 stated in Proposition 1. Suppose, in con-
tradiction to condition 2, that f ∗(b∗
2(b∗
1)) = α > 0 and consider f ′(a2) = α/2 for all a2. This contract
is accepted by the third party and β2[f ′,b∗
1]∈argmaxa2 u2(b∗
1,a2). Therefore, offering f ′ yields player
2 a strictly higher expected payoff than f ∗, a contradiction. Finally, sequential rationality of player 2
immediately implies condition 3.
Before we turn to the proof of Theorem 1 we introduce some notation and prove a supplemen-
tary lemma. Let the number of elements in A1 be equal to n and order its elements so that an
1 %1
an−1
1 %1    a2
1 %1 a1
1. Let ei be the ith standard basis row vector for Rn and deﬁne the row vector
di = ei −ei+1,i = 1,2,...,n −1. Let D be the 2(n −1)×n matrix whose row 2i −1 is di and row 2i
is −di, i = 1,...,n −1. For any b2 ∈ A
A1
2 deﬁne U(b2) as a column vector with 2(n −1) components,










Notation 1. Given two vectors x,y ∈Rn
1. x ≥ y if and only if xi ≥ yi, for all i =1,2,...,n;
2. x > y if and only if xi ≥ yi, for all i =1,2,...,n and x  = y;
3. x ≫ y if and only if xi > yi, for all i =1,2,...,n.
Similarly for ≤, <, and ≪.
For any b2 ∈ A
A1
2 and f ∈C let f (b2) be the column vector with n components, where ith compo-
nent is given by f (b2(ai
1)),i =1,2,...,n.
22Itiswell-known thatifb2 isincreasing, then,underincreasingdifferences, incentivecompatibility
reduces to local incentive compatibility.25 We state it as a lemma for future reference.
Lemma 1. If u2 has increasingdifferences and b2 ∈ A
A1









1)), for all i, j =1,2,...,n






1 ))− f (b2(ai−1







1 ))− f (b2(ai+1
1 )), for all i =1,2,...,n−1.
Proof of Theorem1. [Only if] Suppose that(b∗
1,b∗
2) can be supportedwith incomplete and non-rene-




2[ ] = f ∗,β∗
1[C ] = b∗
1,β∗
2[f ∗,a1] = b∗
2(a1) for all a1 ∈ A1. Given Proposition 1 we only
need to prove that b∗
2 is increasing. Fix orders (%1,%2) in which u2 has strictly increasing differences.
Takeany a1,a′
1 ∈ A1 and assume, without loss of generality, that a1 %1 a′































contradicting that u2 has strictly increasing differences. Therefore, b∗
2 must be increasing.
[If] Let (b∗
1,b∗
2) be a Nash equilibrium of G such that b∗
2 is increasing and b∗
1 = ak
1, for some k =
















1)), for all i, j =1,2,...,n. (16)
By Lemma 1, (16) holds if and only if Df (b∗
2) ≤U(b∗
2). Therefore, we need to show that there exists
f (b∗






















By Gale’s theorem for linear inequalities (Mangasarian (1994), p. 33), there exists such an f (b∗
2) ∈ Rn
if and only if for any y ∈ R2n
+ , E′y = 0 implies y′V ≥ 0. It is easy to show that E′y = 0 if and only if
y1 = y2,y3 = y4,    ,y2n−1 = y2n. Let U(b∗
2)i denote the ith row of U(b∗
2) and note that since b∗
2 is
increasing and u2 has strictly increasing differences,U(b∗
2)2i−1+U(b∗
2)2i ≥0, for any i =1,2,...,n−1.








and the proof is completed.
Proof of Proposition 2. [If] Let (b∗
1,b∗
2) be a Nash equilibrium of G such that b∗
2 is increasing and
renegotiation-proof. This implies that there exists f ′ ∈ C such that (f ′,b∗
2) is incentive compatible
and renegotiation-proof. Let f ∗(b∗
2(a1)) = f ′(b∗
2(a1))− f ′(b∗
2(b∗
1))+δ for all a1 ∈ A1 and note that
f ∗(b∗
2(b∗
1))=δ. Furthermore,usingTheorem2, itcanbeeasilycheckedthat(f ∗,b∗
2)isincentivecom-
patible and renegotiation-proof. For any f  = f ∗ and a1 ∈ A1, let b2,f (a1)∈argmaxa2u2(a1,a2)− f (a2)
and g(f ,a1) ∈argmaxg u2(a1,b2,g(a1))−g(b2,g(a1)) subject to g(b2,g(a′
1))≥ f (b2,f (a′
1)) for all a′
1.
Considerthefollowing assessment (β∗,µ∗)ofΓR(G): β∗










g(f ,a1), if u2(a1,b2,g(f ,a1)(a1))−g(f ,a1)(b2,g(f ,a1)(a1))>u2(a1,b2,f (a1))− f (b2,f (a1))
b2,f (a1), otherwise
for any f  = f ∗ and a1; β∗
2[f ,a1,g,y]=b2,g(a1) and β2,f [f ,a1,g,n]=b∗















y, if g(b2,g(a1))≥ f (b2,f (a1)) ∀a1
n, otherwise
for any g and f  = f ∗; µ∗[C ](f ∗)= 1; For any g, µ∗[I3(f ∗,g)](b∗
1)=1 if g(b2,g(a1))> f ∗(b∗
2(a1)) for all
a1 and µ∗[I3(f ∗,g)](a′
1) = 1 if there exists a′
1 such that f ∗(b∗
2(a′
1)) ≥ g(b2,g(a′
1)); For any f  = f ∗ and
g, µ∗[I3(f ,g)](b∗
1) = 1 if g(b2,g(a1)) ≥ f (b2,f (a1)) for all a1 and µ∗[I3(f ,g)](a′
1) = 1 if there exists a′
1
such that f (b2,f (a′
1)) > g(b2,g(a′
1)). It is easy to check that this assessment induces (b∗
1,b∗
2) and is a
renegotiation-proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium.




2[ ]= f ∗, we haveβ∗
1[C ]=b∗
1, β2[f ∗,a1]=b∗
2(a1)forall a1, andµ∗[C ](f ∗)=














A1, which, together with increasing differences, implies that b∗
2 is increasing.







Suppose, for contradiction, that this is not the case and let ˆ a2 ∈ argmaxa2 u2(b∗





1))> 0. Deﬁne f ′(a2)= f ∗(b∗
2(b∗
1))+ε/2 and note that the third party accepts
24f ′. Assume ﬁrst that β∗
2[f ′,b∗
1] ∈ A2, i.e., f ′ is not renegotiated after b∗
1 and note that sequential
rationality of player 2 implies that β∗
2[f ′,b∗
1]∈argmaxa2u2(b∗
1,a2). Therefore, player 2’s payoff under
f ′ is
u2(b∗








contradicting that (β∗,µ∗) is a PBE. Now assume that f ′ is renegotiated after b∗
1. This implies that















1))− f ′(b2,f ′(b∗
1))
g(b2(b∗
1))≥ f ′(b2,f ′(b∗
1))
which implies that b2(b∗
1)∈argmaxa2u2(b∗






1))− f ′(b2,f ′(b∗
1))
=u2(b∗









contradicting that (β∗,µ∗) is a PBE.
Therefore, by (17) and (18), (b∗
1,b∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium of G and b∗
2 is increasing. Finally, sup-
pose that b∗
2 is not renegotiation-proof. This implies that for any contract f such that (f ,b∗
2) is in-
centive compatible, there exists an a′









1)) and g(b2(a1)) > f (b∗
2(a1)) for all a1. This implies that, in any
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, after history (f ,a′
1) player 2 strictly prefers to renegotiate and offer g
and the third party accepts it. In other words, there exists no renegotiation-proof perfect Bayesian
equilibrium which induces (b∗
1,b∗
2), completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem2. By deﬁnition (f ,b∗
2) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is not renegotiation-proof if and only if there ex-
ist i = 1,2,...,n and incentive compatible (g,b2) ∈ C × A
A1











1)) > f (b∗
2(a
j
1)) for all j = 1,2,...,n. For any (f ,b∗




2)∈Rn be a vector whose row j =1,2,...,n is given by f (b∗
2(a
j
1)). Note that incentive compati-
bility of (g,b2)∈C × A
A1
2 is equivalent to Dg(b2)≤U(b2). Therefore, (f ,b∗
2)∈C × A
A1
2 is not renegoti-
ation-proof if and only if there exist i =1,2,...,n and (g(b2),b2)∈Rn × A
A1









1)), andg(b2)≫ f (b∗
2). Also notethat g(b2)≫ f (b∗
2)
if and only if there exists an ε≫0 such that g(b2)= f (b∗
2)+ε. Therefore, we have the following
Lemma 2. (f ,b∗
2)∈C × A
A1
2 is not renegotiation-proof if and only if there exist i = 1,2,...,n, b2 ∈ A
A1
2 ,







We ﬁrst state a theorem of the alternative, which we will use in the sequel.
Lemma3(Motzkin’s Theorem). Let A andC begivenmatrices,with A beingnon-vacuous. Theneither
1. Ax ≫0 andCx ≥0 has a solution x
26We do not consider the case in which β∗
3[f ′,b∗




2. A′y1+C′y2 =0, y1 >0, y2 ≥0 has a solution y1,y2
but not both.
Proof of Lemma 3. See Mangasarian (1994), p. 28.
For any (f ,b∗
2) ∈ C × A
A1
2 , b2 ∈ A
A1

















1)))e1−ei+1. Note thatC and A dependon andareuniquelyde-
ﬁnedby(f ,b∗
2)and(i,b2)butwesuppressthisdependencyfornotationalconvenience. Thefollowing




2 isrenegotiation-proofifandonlyiffor anyi =1,2,...,n andb2 ∈ A
A1
2 there
exist y ∈Rn+2 and z ∈R2(n−1) such that A′y +C′z =0, y >0, z ≥0.











is true if and only if for some i and b2 there exists an x ∈ Rn+1 such that Ax ≫ 0 and Cx ≥ 0. To see

















2 ,b2 ∈ A
A1
2 ,andi =1,2,...,n,letU(b2)j denotethe j-throw ofvectorU(b2)





















1)), for l =i +1,i +2,...,n,
βj =U(b2)2j +U(b2)2j−1, for j =1,2,...,n−1.
Again, note that αj and βj depend on and are uniquely deﬁned by (f ,b∗
2) and (i,b2) but we suppress
this dependency. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For any (f ,b∗
2) ∈ C × A
A1
2 , b2 ∈ A
A1
2 , and i = 1,2,...,n, there exist y ∈ Rn+2 and z ∈ R2(n−1)
suchthat A′y+C′z =0, y >0, and z ≥0 ifand only ifthereexist ˆ y ∈Rn+1 and ˆ z ∈R(n−1) suchthat ˆ y >0,
ˆ z ≥0, and
n+1  
j=1
αj ˆ yj +
n−1  
j=1
βj ˆ zj =0 (19)
26Proof of Lemma 5. Fix (f ,b∗
2) ∈ C × A
A1
2 , b2 ∈ A
A1
2 , and i = 1,2,...,n. First note that for any y and z,
















−1 isthen-dimensionalvectorobtainedfrom A′y byeliminatingtheﬁrstrow. Recursively







to a row echelon form












































Therefore, A′y +C′z = 0 if and only if equations (22) through (25) hold. Now suppose that there exist






z2j, j =1,...,i −1
z2j−1, j =i,...,n−1
It is easy to verify that ˆ y >0, ˆ z ≥0, and
 n+1
j=1 αj ˆ yj +
 n−1
j=1 βj ˆ zj =0.
Conversely, suppose that there exist ˆ y ∈Rn+1 and ˆ z ∈R(n−1) such that ˆ y > 0, ˆ z ≥ 0, and (19) holds.
Deﬁne yj = ˆ yj for j = 1,...,n+1 and yn+2 =
 n+1
i=1 ˆ yj. For any j = 1,...,i −1, let z2j−1 = ˆ zj +
 j
k=1 yk+1
and z2j = ˆ zj, and for any j =i,...,n−1, let z2j−1 = ˆ zj and z2j = ˆ zj +
 n
k=j+1yk+1. It is straightforward
to show that y >0, z ≥0, and (22) through (25) hold. This completes the proof of Lemma 5.
Lemmas 4 and 5 imply that (f ,b∗
2) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is renegotiation-proof if and only if for any i ∈
{1,2,...,n} and b2 ∈ A
A1
2 , there exist ˆ y ∈ Rn+1 and ˆ z ∈ R(n−1) such that ˆ y > 0, ˆ z ≥ 0, and equation
(19) holds. We can now complete the proof of Theorem 2.








1), but there is no k =1,2,...,i −1 such that (5) holds and no l =i +1,...,n
such that (6) holds. This implies that αj >0 for all j =1,...,n+1. Since u2 has increasing differences,
βj ≥ 0 for all j = 1,...,n −1. Therefore, ˆ y > 0 and ˆ z ≥ 0 imply that
 n+1
j=1 αj ˆ yj +
 n−1
j=1 βj ˆ zj > 0, which,
by Lemma 5, contradicts that (f ,b∗
2) is renegotiation-proof.
[If] Fix arbitrary i = 1,2,...,n and increasing b2 ∈ A
A1






27poseﬁrstthatthereexistsak ∈{1,...,i−1}suchthat(5)holds. Thisimpliesthatαi+1 >0andαk+1 ≤0.
Let ˆ yk+1 =1, ˆ yi+1 =
−αk+1
αi+1 ≥0, and all theother ˆ yj =0 and ˆ zj =0. This implies that equation (19) holds
and, by Lemma 5, that (f ,b∗
2) is renegotiation-proof. Suppose now that there exists an l ∈{i +1,...,n}
such that (6) holds. Then, αi+1 > 0 and αl+1 ≤ 0. Let ˆ yl+1 = 1, ˆ yi+1 =
−αl+1
αi+1 ≥0 and all the other ˆ yj = 0
and ˆ zj =0. This, again, implies that (19) holds and that (f ,b∗
2) is renegotiation-proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Supposethatb∗
2 isrenegotiation-proofandﬁxani =1,...,n andabi
2 ∈B(i,b∗
2).




































Incentive compatibility of (f ,b∗
2) implies that Df (b∗
2) ≤ 0. Renegotiation proofness, by Theorem 2,
implies that ck f (b∗
2)≤ −wk for some k ∈ {1,...,i −1} or cl f (b∗




By Gale’s theorem of linear inequalities, this implies that x ≥ 0 and E′x = 0 implies x′Vk ≥ 0. Denote
the ﬁrst 2(n −1) elements of x by y and the last element by z. It is easy to show that E′x = 0 implies




























Increasing differences imply that −wk +
 i−1
j=kU(b∗
2)2j−1 ≥0 and hence k is a blocking action.
Similarly, we can show that, if there exists an l ∈ {i +1,...,n} such that cl f (b∗
2) ≤ −wl, then l is a
blocking action, and this completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. We will show that there exists an f ∈ C such that (f ,b∗
2) is incentive compat-
ible and renegotiation-proof. For any i = 1,...,n and bi
2 ∈ B(i,b∗
2) pick a blocking action m(bi
2) that
satisﬁes the conditions of the proposition. Let cbi
2 = ei −em(bi





2)|×n matrixC have row cbi
2 corresponding to each bi






























2)|×1 vector W have row wbi








Observe that if E f (b∗
2) ≤ V, then Df (b∗
2) ≤ U(b∗
2), and hence (f ,b∗
2) is incentive compatible. Fur-
thermore, E f (b∗
2) ≤ V implies W ≤ −C f (b∗
2), and, by Theorem 2, that (f ,b∗
2) is renegotiation-proof.
Therefore, if we can show that there exists f (b∗
2)∈Rn such that E f (b∗
2)≤V , the proof would be com-
pleted. By Gale’s theorem of linear inequalities this is equivalent to showing x ≥0 and E′x =0 implies




2)| components constitute z. Notice that for any i = 1,...,n and bi
2 ∈ B(i,b∗
2) there is a
corresponding element of z, which we will denote zbi
2.
Recursively adding row 1 to row 2, row 2 to row 3, and so on, we can reduce E′ to a row echelon
form and show that E′x =0 if and only if









Let J− ={j ∈{1,...,n−1}:∃bi
2 such that i ≤ j ≤m(bi
2)−1}and J+ ={j ∈{1,...,n−1}:∃bi
2 such that m(bi
2)≤
j ≤i−1}andnotethat J−∩J+ = . Toseethis, suppose,forcontradiction,thatthereexistsa j ∈ J−∩J+.
Therefore,thereexistsabi
2 suchthati ≤ j ≤m(bi
2)−1andbi′
2 such thatm(bi′
2 )≤ j ≤i′−1. Thisimplies
that i < i′, m(bi
2)> i, m(bi′
2 )<i′, but m(bi
2)>m(bi′
2 ), contradicting the conditions of the proposition.








for j ∈ J− and

































































Increasing differences, the deﬁnition of m(bi
2), and y,z ≥ 0 imply that x′V ≥ 0, and the proof is com-
pleted.
Proof of Theorem3. Before we proceed to the proof of the theorem, we ﬁrst introduce some deﬁni-
tions and prove an intermediate lemma.
Deﬁnition 13. For any b2 ∈ A
A1
2 we say that i ∈{1,2,...,n} has right (left) deviationat b2 if there exists




1)). Otherwise, we say that i has no
right (left) deviation at b2.
Let BRj(a−j) = argmaxaj uj(aj,a−j), for j = 1,2. For any b2 ∈ A
A1
2 and i ∈ {1,...,n} that has right
deviation at b2 deﬁne
R(i)={k >i :b2(ak
1)∈BR2(ak
1) and i < j <k implies that j has no left deviation at b2}.
Similarly, for i ∈{1,...,n} that has left deviation at b2 let
L(i)={k <i :b2(ak
1)∈BR2(ak
1) and k < j <i implies that j has no right deviation at b2},
Lemma 6. b∗
2 is renegotiation-proof if for any i1 (i2) that has right (left) deviation at b∗
2, R(i1)  =  
(L(i2) = ), and i1 <i2 implies R(i1)∩L(i2) = .
Proof of Lemma 6. Fix an i ∈ {1,...,n} and bi
2 ∈ B(i,b∗











1)}. If J =  , let m(bi
2) =
minR(i) and if J  = , let m(bi










































which implies that m(bi












1)}. If J = , let m(bi
2)=maxL(i) and if J  = , let m(bi










































which, again, implies that m(bi
2) is a blocking action.
30Finally, suppose that there exist i1 < i2 such that m(b
i1
2 ) > i1 and m(b
i2
2 ) < i2. This implies that i1
has right deviation and i2 has left deviation at b∗





2 ) and the proof is completed by applying Proposition 4.
We can now proceed to the proof of Theorem 3.





1 , and a selection (br1,br2) such that a∗
2 = br2(a∗




   
   




1 -1 a1 ≺1 a1
br2(a1), a1 = a1
First, note that b2 is increasing and b2(a∗
1) = a∗
2. Second, since u2 is single peaked, b2 satisﬁes the











Therefore, take any a1 such that a∗
1 ≺1 a1 ≺1 a1. Since NE(S(G)) is stable, a1 ≻1 a∗
1 %1 br1(br2(a∗
1)),








1 ∈argmaxa1u1(a1,b2(a1)) and hence (a∗
1,b2) is a Nash equilibrium ofG.
[Only if] Suppose that (a∗
1,a∗
2) ∈ A1 × A2 can be supported with incomplete and renegotiable con-
tracts. This, by Theorem 1, implies that there exists an increasing b2 ∈ A
A1
2 such that (a∗
1,b2) is a
Nash equilibrium of G and b2(a∗
1) = a∗




Suppose, for contradiction, that a∗
1 ≺1 aNE
1 . Stability of NE(S(G)) implies that a∗
1 -1 br1(a∗
2), for
any br1. Fix a br1 and let a′
1 = br1(a∗





















where the last inequality follows from positive externality. This contradicts that (a∗
1,b2) is a Nash
equilibrium ofG.
Choose br2 ∈ BR2 such that a∗
2 = br2(a∗
1) = b2(a∗
1) and take any br1 ∈ BR1. Suppose, for contra-




1 such that u1(a′
1,a2)>u1(a∗
1,br2(a∗









where the ﬁrst inequality follows from positive externality and that b2 is increasing. This contradicts
that (a∗
1,b2) is a Nash equilibrium.
To prove that u1(a∗
1,br2(a∗
1))≥u1(a1,br2(a1)), we ﬁrst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7. If b2 ∈ A
A1
2 is renegotiation-proof, then a1 does not have right deviation.27
27See Deﬁnition 13.
31Proof of Lemma 7. Let an
1 = a1 and suppose, for contradiction, that an
1 has right deviation, i.e., there
exists a′
2 ≻2 b2(an











2, a1 = an
1
b2(a1), a1 ≺1 an
1
Note that b′





































for all k <n, which, by Proposition 3, contradicts that b2 is renegotiation-proof.








where the ﬁrst inequality follows from no right deviation at a1 (Lemma 7) and positive externality.
Therefore, u1(a1,b2(a1)) > u1(a∗
1,b2(a∗
1)), which contradicts that (a∗
1,b2) is a Nash equilibrium of G,
and the proof is completed.
Proof of Theorem4. By deﬁnition (f ,b∗
2) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is not strongly renegotiation-proof if and only if





























1))} for all j =1,2,...,n. The following lemma easily follows.
Lemma 8. (f ,b∗
2) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is not strongly renegotiation-proof if and only if there exist i = 1,2,...,n,
b2 ∈ A
A1
2 , and ε ∈ Rn such that D(f (b∗















1))} for all j =1,2,...,n.
Deﬁne the matrices V and C as in the proof of Theorem 2, and deﬁne the matrix A as follows:






1))}e1+ej+1. We have the following lemma, whose proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.
Lemma 9. (f ,b∗
2) ∈ C × A
A1
2 is strongly renegotiation-proof if and only if for any i = 1,2,...,n and
b2 ∈ A
A1
2 there exist y ∈Rn+2 and z ∈R2(n−1) such that A′y +C′z =0, y >0, z ≥0.
The rest of the proof is almost identical to that of Theorem 2, and therefore is omitted.
Lemma 10. If u1 and u2 have strictlyincreasingdifferences, then NE(S(G)) is stable.
Proof of Lemma 10. Assume that u1 and u2 have strictly increasing differences and ﬁx a selection
(br1,br2). It is a standard result that br1 and br2 are increasing. Suppose, for contradiction, that
there exists an a1 %1 a
NE
1 such that br1(br2(a1)) ≻1 a1. Consider the sequence (at
1,at
2), t = 0,1,...
deﬁned by a0
1 = a1, at
2 =br2(at
1), t =0,1,..., and at
1 =br1(at−1
2 ), t =1,2,....
We claim that there exist i = 1,2 and k = 1,2,... such that ak
i = ai. We will show that if at
i ≺i
ai for i = 1,2 and t = 0,1,...,k −1, then ak
i ≻i ak−1
i , k = 1,2,.... The claim then follows from the
32ﬁniteness of Ai. Note that a0
1 ≺1 a1 by assumption and assume that a0
















1, which implies that (a1
1,a1
2) ∈ NE(S(G)), contradicting that a
NE
1 is the
greatest Nash equilibrium action. Therefore, we must have a1
2 ≻2 a0
2. This shows that the claim holds
for k = 1. Now suppose that it holds for k = 1,2,...,l −1 and assume that ak
i ≺i ai, for i = 1,2 and
k = 1,...,l −1. We then have al
1 = br1(al−1
2 ) %1 br1(al−2
2 ) = al−1
1 . If al
1 = al−1










Nash equilibrium action. Therefore, al
1 ≻1 al−1
1 . Similarly, al
2 = br2(al
1) %2 br2(al−1
1 ) = al−1





2 )∈ NE(S(G)), againcontradictingthat a
NE
1 is thegreatest Nash equilibrium action.
Therefore, al
2 ≻2 al−1
2 , completing the proof.
Now, assume, withoutlossofgenerality, that ak









2) ∈ NE(S(G)), contradicting that a
NE
1 is the greatest Nash




1 ) %2 br2(ak
1) = a2, and hence ak+1
2 = a2. This im-
plies that (ak+1
1 ,a2) ∈ NE(S(G)), again contradicting that a
NE
1 is the greatest Nash equilibrium ac-
tion.
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